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Although many studies indicate that both the level 
and composition of public spending are significant for 
economic growth, the results in the empirical literature 
are still mixed. This paper studies the importance of 
country sample selection and expenditure classification 
in explaining these conflicting results. It investigates a set 
of fast-growing countries versus a mix of countries with 
different growth patterns. The regression specifications 
include different components of public expenditure 
and total fiscal revenues, always considering the overall 
government budget constraint. 
   Total public spending is first disaggregated using a 
definition that classifies public spending as productive 
versus unproductive components, an a priori criterion 
that is based on the expected impact of public spending 
items on the private sector production function. After 
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empirically confirming the validity of this definition 
in the panel analysis, the authors suggest and test an 
alternative definition of “core” public spending that 
may be more appropriate for developing countries. The 
empirical analysis shows that the link between growth 
and public spending, especially the productive and “core” 
components, is strong only for the fast-growing group. In 
addition, macroeconomic stability, openness, and private 
sector investment are significant in the fast-growing 
group, which points to the existence of an economic 
policy environment more conducive to growth in the 
first group of countries. The authors conclude that public 
spending can be a significant determinant of growth for 
countries that are capable of using funds for productive 
purposes. 
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Even though, in many studies, it has been shown that total public spending and some of 
its components are significant for economic growth, the empirical literature results are 
still mixed. We try to understand the importance of country sample selection and 
expenditure classification to explain these conflicting results. We conclude that public 
spending can be a significant determinant of growth for countries that are capable of 
using expenditures for productive purposes. As a follow up to a previous study
2, this 
paper empirically investigates how the impact of public spending on growth varies when 
countries are classified according to their overall growth performances. The analysis 
compares fast-growing versus a mix of countries with different growth patterns. Seven 
countries are included in each group and the dataset covers the period of 1970-2005. In 
the regression specifications we include different components of public expenditure and 
fiscal revenues, always considering the overall government budget constraint. A priori, 
while the size of the government does not appear to be much different (on average) in 
these two groups, the composition of public expenditures varies significantly. A 
posteriori, the empirical analysis based on OLS and dynamic GMM techniques for panel 
data shows that the link between public spending, especially both its productive and 
“core” components, and growth, after controlling for other macroeconomic and private 
sector variables, and taking into account country initial conditions, is both economically 
and statistically strong only for the fast-growing group. When all countries are combined 
in the same regression analysis, the link between government spending and growth gets 
much weaker on average and even turns negative in some cases. However, when group 
effects in the combined set are controlled for, through interactive dummies, the stronger 
link between public spending and growth in the fast-growing group is clearly confirmed. 
A possible nonlinear relationship between growth and public spending is also 
investigated, but no statistical significance is found for it. Macroeconomic stability, 
openness, and private sector investment are confirmed to be significant in the fast-
growing country group, which point out to the existence of a policy environment more 
conducive to growth in that group of countries. A final implication of the analysis is that 
differences in empirical findings of the previous literature linking public spending and 
economic growth may be explained by the selection of countries included. 
 
                                                 
2 Moreno-Dodson (2008) shows that the volume of total public spending as well as its composition are 
relevant in explaining economic growth for a set of fast-growing developing countries during 1970-2004. 3 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of public spending and its components in economic growth has been 
extensively studied in the literature. Within an endogenous growth framework, Barro 
(1990) first introduced public sector components in the production function. Many 
empirical studies have followed this seminal paper to investigate the possible link 
between various components of government spending and growth, using many different 
econometric techniques, empirical settings, and samples of countries. Results presented 
in the literature are mixed. Even though most studies support the substantial positive link 
between some components of public spending and growth, there is still no agreement on 
which categories of spending promote growth. The introduction of advanced econometric 
techniques and new variables in the empirical specifications has not solved the problem 
entirely.  
 
One possible explanation for the mixed results in the literature is sample selection. What 
we expect is that public spending can improve growth performance of countries only if 
they are able to use these expenditures productively. In light of this expectation, we raise 
the following questions:  
 
(1) Are there any obvious differences, in terms of the level of public spending, its 
components, and their link to growth, between fast-growing developing countries and 
other developing countries where growth records are less impressive or volatile?  
 
(2) What is the role of the composition of public spending with respect to the growth 
performance of countries?  
 
Given that many governments in developing countries have been increasing public 
spending to provide a short-term economic stimulus since the start of the 2009 global 
economic crisis, we believe that the questions above are more relevant than ever. Indeed, 
they may have important implications for changes in the composition of public 
expenditure, to the extent that different allocations may involve dynamic tradeoffs in 
their short- and medium-term impacts on growth. 
 
While most empirical analyses linking public spending and growth combine many 
different countries in their samples, this paper groups countries into two: a homogeneous 
sample of developing countries in terms of their growth performances and a more 
heterogeneous sample. The analysis presented is applied to a sample of seven fast-
growing developing countries (the same group considered in Moreno-Dodson, 2008)
3 and 
seven other developing countries whose growth patterns have been somehow less stable 
and more volatile during the period of analysis. The first set contains Korea, Singapore, 
                                                 
3 Moreno-Dodson (2008) empirically investigates the impact of public spending and its components on 
economic growth, focusing on a sample of seven fast-growing developing countries. She finds that some 
components of public expenditure, particularly those considered “productive,” can significantly explain 
economic growth. Despite the fact that there are some differences at the country level, the results are 
consistent across different econometric techniques used to estimate the statistical significance of public 
spending items. 4 
 
Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Botswana, and Mauritius, which were among the top 
performers in the world in terms of GDP per capita growth during the period between 
1960 and 2005.
4 The second set includes Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines, 
Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela, and is taken as a comparison group to enhance and 
validate the previous econometric estimates and to further examine the influence of 
public expenditures on growth in a larger group of developing countries.
5  
 
Two alternative classifications of public spending are introduced in the paper. Total 
public spending is first disaggregated using a definition based on Bleaney, Kneller, and 
Gemmell (2001), and Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998), which classifies public 
spending as productive versus unproductive components, an a priori criteria which is 
based on the expected impact of public spending items on the private sector production 
function. After empirically confirming the validity of this definition in our cross-country 
analysis, we suggest and test an alternative definition of “core” public spending which, 
we think, can be more appropriate for developing countries.  
 
In the specifications we include fiscal revenues, always considering the overall 
government budget constraint. Introducing the government budget constraint has been 
essential to separate the possible positive effect of public spending on growth while 
taking into account its sources of financing and their possible negative implications for 
growth. When looking at the coefficients of public spending together with fiscal revenue 
and balance, the net effect of public spending on growth can be clearer. In the empirical 
specifications, total public spending and its components are lagged one period. The 
rationale is that it takes time for executed public spending to influence growth. 
 
The paper presents a comparative analysis and panel regressions using OLS and dynamic 
GMM techniques. Since we use annual data, the focus of the OLS results is on the short-
run analysis, while the GMM results refer to a dynamic, multi-year framework. For 
robustness check it is important to confirm the results using different econometric 
techniques. The GMM technique also controls for endogeneity among regressors.  
 
In addition to the linear relationship between public spending and growth, a possible 
nonlinear link must also be analyzed. The nonlinear analysis is essential to understand the 
shape of the function linking growth to public spending and can have different policy 
implications.
6 For example, if the link between public spending and growth is positive 
and concave, higher and higher public spending may have less and less impact on growth. 
On the other hand, if the link is positive and convex, we expect higher public spending to 
                                                 
4 All the countries selected in the sample have sustained GDP per capita growth rates of at least 3% (by 
decade average) during 1960-2005.  
5 It should be noted that the availability of data for the period of analysis is the main decision factor in 
selecting these countries.  
6Another type of nonlinearities associated with the effect of government spending on growth relates to 
threshold effects. In particular, there is increasing evidence that spending on infrastructure may be subject 
to “critical mass” or “network” effects, which imply that its impact on growth becomes significant (or is 
magnified) beyond a certain level; see for instance Pushak, Tiongson, and Varoudakis (2007) and 
Kellenberg (2009). However, this type of nonlinearities is mostly associated with the stock of public assets, 
rather than spending flows, which are the focus of this paper. 5 
 
lead to a relatively even larger effect on growth. When compared with previous papers, 
the main difference of our nonlinear analysis is that we consider a dynamic setting where 
the overall budget constraint is also taken into account. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents the literature review. Section III 
presents the data and provides relevant facts and information about the two groups of 
countries during the period of analysis. Section IV describes the empirical methodology, 
function specification, and variables selected. Section V is dedicated to panel regression 
analysis. Finally, Section VI draws policy implications and concludes. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Despite the fact that the link between public expenditure and economic growth has been 
investigated extensively in the literature, robust conclusions have been difficult to 
establish.
7 Even though, in recent studies, there is some convergence in terms of the 
significance of public spending on growth, the results still change from country to 
country, or from sample to sample, and appear to be a function of many different factors.
  
 
Conflicting results start from the earlier years of the literature. In his influential 
theoretical paper, Barro (1990) extends the endogenous growth framework including tax-
financed government services. He concludes that government expenditure is positively 
linked to economic growth when the share of government expenditure (and consequently 
the tax rate) is low, but then turns negative due to increasing inefficiencies as the share of 
expenditure increases (related to the disincentive effect of higher tax rates on private 
capital accumulation), indicating a nonlinear relationship between government 
expenditure and growth. But, in his follow-up paper (Barro, 1991), the theoretically 
expected link between public spending and growth could not be empirically proved. 
Using cross-country analysis and including 98 developing countries for the period of 
1960-1985, the study finds that public consumption is negatively correlated with growth, 
while public investment does not have a significant impact on economic development.  
 
There are also other early empirical studies indicating the opposite.
8 Grossman (1990), 
using a sample consisting of 48 developed and developing countries, shows that 
government spending has both positive and negative impacts on growth; the positive one 
works through higher productivity and the negative one is caused by inefficient provision 
and distortionary effects of public taxation. However, he concludes that the positive 
influence dominates. Similarly, Levine and Renelt (1992) show that taking into account 
the components of government spending can make a difference. In their paper, they 
separate government spending in two broad categories, consumption expenditure and 
                                                 
7 See Slemrod (1995) for the literature review on the link between government expenditure, taxes, and 
growth. 
8 An empirical study of Easterly and Rebelo (1993), using a sample similar to the one used by Barro 
(1991), finds that public investment in communication and transportation as well as general government 
investment promotes economic growth. Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) review some of the papers studying 
the influence of productive government expenditures on long-run growth and conclude that government 
expenditures on health, education and infrastructure have large impacts on growth. 6 
 
investment outlays. For 119 developed and developing countries during the period of 
1974 to 1989, they find a negative relationship between government consumption and 
growth, but a clear positive link between public investment and growth.  
 
When we focus on most recent studies, conflicting results still continue to be found. One 
of the recent papers by Schaltegger and Torgler (2006) suggests that large public 
expenditure lowers growth for high-income countries. Folster and Henrekson (2001) 
suggest that the more the econometric problems that are addressed, the more robust the 
link between government size and economic growth gets, while Agell, Ohlsson, and 
Thoursie (2006) object to this finding, indicating that there is no robust relationship 
between growth and the share of government expenditure. In his paper, Park (2006) tests 
whether the combination of productive public investment and lower taxes increases 
growth and whether current government consumption and higher taxes lower it. He 
cannot find any robust empirical results using a set of countries combining both 
developed and developing countries. Gupta, Clements, Baldacci, and Mulas-Granados 
(2005) show that government expenditure, especially its capital component, has a 
positive impact on growth for low-income countries when it is combined with a lower 
budget deficit. Baldacci, Clements, Gupta, and Cui (2008) indicate that, with explicit 
control for governance, and incorporation of nonlinearity, both education and health 
spending support higher growth in developing countries. Segura-Ubiergo, Simone, 
Gupta, and Cui (2009) present a positive impact of fiscal adjustment on growth in 
transition economies. Wahab (2004) and Colombier (2009), focusing on OECD 
countries, and Ang (2009), studying the case of Malaysia, all support the significance of 
public capital expenditure for growth.  
 
Even when the papers that use empirical specifications or estimation techniques similar to 
ours are investigated, conflicting empirical results continue. Kneller, Bleaney, and 
Gemmell (1999) and Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller (2001), including 22 developed 
countries, support Barro (1990): productive expenditure is good for growth, but 
distortionary taxes lower its impact. Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007) introduce 
government financing variables (government budget surplus/deficit and tax revenue) in a 
study where they focus on a panel of 30 developing countries over the 1970s and 1980s. 
They find that while the capital component of government expenditure, especially 
education expenditure, is positively linked to growth, the current component does not 
have any significant impact on economic growth. Similarly, Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) 
and Benos (2009) take account of the revenue side of the government budget constraint 
considering tax and non-tax revenues, and also the government budget balance. Both 
papers use a GMM technique for panel datasets. But, they find conflicting results. Benos 
(2009) show that a reallocation of the components of government spending, especially 
toward infrastructure and human capital, can enhance growth using 14 European Union 
countries, while Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), for a group of 15 developing countries, 
show that the current component of spending has a positive impact on growth while the 
capital component influences it negatively.  
 
While most empirical studies in the literature use a heterogeneous sample of countries to 
investigate the relationship between government spending and growth, Moreno-Dodson 7 
 
(2008) includes only fast-growing developing countries and shows that the link between 
total public spending and growth is overall positive with some components of public 
spending being particularly significant in affecting growth. For this group of countries, 
unproductive components of public expenditure are less significant
9—or even have a 




Our paper extends this initial empirical study in a way to answer the question of whether 
the findings presented in the literature are sensitive to country sample selection bias. We 
try to accomplish this goal by extending the initial data set and including a mix of 
countries with different growth performances. 
 
III.  DATA AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 




Two sets of countries are included in the analysis. The first group consists of the seven 
fast-growing developing countries. The second set includes countries with less consistent 
and more volatile growth performance patterns.
11 The regression period is 1970-2005.
12 




III.2. Comparative Analysis 
 
This section investigates some country facts and findings, and compares different country 
characteristics on public expenditure and growth that may be helpful when interpreting 
the subsequent econometric results.  
First, when the growth rates of GDP per capita are compared for these two groups of 
countries, it can be seen that, by definition, in the first set, countries have grown much 
faster on average between 1970 and 2005 (see Tables 1 and 2). While this group has 
almost 5 percent growth rate on average, the second group has a mean growth rate of 1.6 
percent. As can be seen in Figure 1, the first group outperforms the second set of 
countries throughout the period of 1970 to 2005 except during the Asian financial crises 
of 1997-98, and the years 2004 and 2005 thanks to high growth performance of countries 
like Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela in the comparison set.  
                                                 
9 Defined a priori using the definition by Bleaney, Gemmell, and Kneller (2001); and Kneller, Bleaney and 
Gemmell (1998 and 1999). 
10 Similarly, Rogers (2008) shows that the impact of public schooling expenditures on economic growth is 
significantly higher in countries that are using schooling productively. 
11 The list of countries in the fast-growing set and the comparison set is given in the introduction section. 
12 The time period may change slightly from one country to another depending on data availability at the 
country level. 
13 Details on variables and data sources are presented in the Appendix to this paper as well as in Moreno-
Dodson (2008). 8 
 
A simple measure of productivity, real GDP per worker (i.e. ratio of GDP to labor force), 
is calculated to understand possible differences between the two groups of countries. 
Figure 2 compares the average productivity in the two groups between 1980 and 2005. 
While the productivity level of the second group of developing countries has been almost 
flat, the fast-growing countries exhibit increasing productivity levels and, as a result, the 
level of productivity for this group passes the one in the comparison group after 1990. 
The gap between the two groups continues to grow wider throughout the decades.  
Together with increasing productivity in the fast-growing countries, we see that the share 
of industrial production has also increased over time. Figure 3 summarizes changes in the 
value added activities in the industrial sector for these two groups. While the share of 
industrial production is increasing and stays stable right above 40 percent of GDP for the 
first group, this share drops from 37 percent to around 30 percent of GDP after 1990 in 
the second group of countries. 
The second column of Tables 1 and 2 gives information about the size of public spending 
as a share of GDP in the two groups of countries. While there are no sensible differences 
in the size of the government budget between the two groups, an upward trend is 
observed in the second group in recent years. For example it jumped to 33 percent in 
Turkey on average between 2000 and 2005 and 31 percent in Uruguay.  
 
Other than these trends, with the exception of Botswana, all countries in our sample have 
managed to keep a relatively small size of total public spending, which is below 30 
percent of GDP,
14 with the exception of Botswana at 38 percent. On the other side, 
Singapore in the first sample, and the Philippines and Mexico in the second, managed to 
keep the share of government expenditure in GDP relatively stable and at low levels 
throughout the period analyzed. While Singapore has 18 percent public spending in 
percent of GDP on average, Mexico and the Philippines have 17 and 16 percent 
respectively.  
 
Regarding the budget deficit, we observe that it is slightly larger for the comparison 
group (-1.9 percent of GDP on average) than the one for the fast-growing countries (-1.3 
percent).  
 
When we compare, in Tables 1 and 2, the share of productive expenditure in total public 
expenditure, a priori according to the definition of Bleany, Gemmell, and Kneller (2001), 
we can see that the share is significantly higher for the first group of countries (64 
percent), while it is only 50 percent for the second group throughout the period included 
in the study.
15 The other interesting observation is that this share tends to decline 
significantly for the second group (see Figure 4) especially after 1980. Thus, the gap 
                                                 
14 The definition used here refers to the consolidated central government only, which includes the central 
government plus all government entities associated to it, and excludes all public spending at sub-national 
level since it was not feasible to construct a reliable database for the consolidated general government 
including all countries in the sample. 
15 Productive expenditure is defined as the sum of general public services expenditure, defense expenditure, 
educational expenditure, health expenditure, housing expenditure, transportation and communication 
expenditure. See, for example, Bleaney, Kneller, and Gemmell (2001). 9 
 
between the shares of productive expenditure in the two groups increases significantly as 
time goes on, despite the fact that they were relatively close during the mid to late 1970s.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 also compare the share of “core” public spending, which is introduced in 
this paper as an alternative definition. This classification may be more appropriate for 
some developing countries, as it includes public spending in energy and fuel which is 
often closely interlinked with other critical spending categories and can affect 
significantly their overall impact on growth.
16 The share of “core” spending in total 
expenditures is somehow different in the two groups, but only 4 percentage points higher, 
on average, in the fast-growing set. In the tables, it can be also seen that the share of 
“core” items is close across some countries in each group with the exception of Uruguay 
in the comparison group and Korea in the fast-growing group which have relatively lower 
shares, and Botswana in the fast-growing group and Costa Rica in the comparison group 
which have higher shares.  
 
The second panel of Figure 4 aggregates the share of “core” spending throughout the 
entire time period in the two sets of countries. In the figure, it can be observed that the 
share of “core” spending is significantly declining in the comparison group after 1985, 
while it is relatively stable in the fast-growing group. As a result, the gap between the two 
groups is getting larger overtime.  
 
Another major difference that can help us explain, a priori, the gap between growth 
performances of the two groups of countries may be in the shares of public gross fixed 
capital formation as percent of GDP. Indeed, Figure 5 clearly shows that public 
investment is much larger in the fast-growing countries. The share of public investment 
in GDP is around 10 percent for the first group of countries, while it is only 5 percent for 
the second group. Given the significance of public investment, especially its 
infrastructure component, in economic growth, this difference between the two groups is 
striking.  
 
Possible differences between the two groups may also be associated with government 
effectiveness and quality of governance. Figure 6 presents the percentiles for government 
effectiveness.
17 The figure shows that, in terms of government effectiveness, all countries 
in the first group (with the exception of Indonesia) rank more favorably in comparison 
with the second group. When we investigate their position (last seven countries in Figure 
6), we can see that the percentiles are much lower at around 60, with the exception of 
Chile, which has a government effectiveness index above 80.
18 In the whole sample of 
                                                 
16 The other difference between this definition and the previous one is that it excludes defense spending, a 
sector whose a priori impact on the private sector production function is less well known by economists. 
“Core” spending includes general public services expenditure, educational expenditure, health expenditure, 
housing expenditure, transportation and communication expenditure, and expenditure on fuel and energy.  
17 According to the Kraay, Kauffman and Mastruzzi (KKM) indicators, government effectiveness measures 
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service, the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. 
18 KKM indicators using a (0-100) percentile rank, World Bank. It should be noted that 1996 is the earliest 
year in the database.  10 
 
countries, Singapore enjoys the highest government effectiveness index. At the other 
extreme, Venezuela’s government effectiveness is in the bottom 16 percentile. Similarly, 
Figure 7 shows the differences in the bureaucracy quality between the two groups. The 
gap between the two groups is obvious although it has gotten smaller in recent years.  
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
 
The section introduces the empirical specification and the econometric techniques used to 
estimate the coefficients of the specifications. 
 
IV.1. Basic Empirical Specification  
 
The empirical specification used in the analysis is similar to the one presented in Moreno-
Dodson (2008). We add new techniques to control for possible differences between the 
two groups of countries in order to better understand the impact of public expenditure and 
its components on growth. We also introduce nonlinearities in some specifications. 
 
The basic panel regression equation is run separately for the fast-growing and the 
comparison group as well as for the pooled dataset:
19 
 




i is the country index, 
 
t is the year index, 
 
y ˆ  is the rate of growth of GDP per capita, 
 
p is the ratio of private investment to GDP,
20 
 
HC is the initial human capital index, 
 
FR is the ratio of total fiscal revenues to GDP, 
 
PE is the ratio of total public expenditures to GDP in period t-1,
21  
                                                 
19 Detailed explanation of the logic behind the specification is presented in Moreno-Dodson (2008). 
20 In some regressions, openness is used as a control variable instead of the private investment-to-GDP 
ratio. 
21 Unlike other studies testing only the impact of public investment on growth while ignoring current 
spending, this analysis includes total public spending, capital and current, without specifically separating 
them. The rationale for this decision is based on the evidence that some categories of current spending 
items are indeed critical to ensure the profitability of investments. For example, operations and 
maintenance expenditures, which are considered as current spending items, are critical to ensure the 11 
 
FS is the ratio of the fiscal balance (deficit or surplus) to GDP, 
 
CPIINF is the inflation rate, 
 
and b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, and b7 are the coefficients assigned to the independent variables.  
 
The government budget constraint is considered in the specification by including 
revenues, expenditures, and the fiscal balance. The empirical specification introduced in 
the paper includes the government budget constraint to avoid biases associated with 
incomplete specification ignoring financing options of governments and budget balance, 
in line with other recent papers in the literature.
22  
 
Due to the inclusion of the budget constraint in the regressions, we excluded some 
expenditure items named as “other expenditures” (most of them non-classified or 
classified as “others”) to prevent any multicollinearity problem. We also include the 
lagged value of public spending since we believe there is a time lag between its execution 
and its impact on growth. In some specifications, total fiscal revenues are disaggregated 
into tax and non-tax revenues.  
 
 
IV.2. Empirical Specification Capturing the Classification of Public Expenditure 
 
Total public spending is disaggregated using a definition based on Bleaney, Kneller, and 
Glemmell (2001), and Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1998), which classifies public 
spending as productive versus unproductive components (a priori). As noted by these 
authors, government spending items are classified according to whether or not they are 
expected to be relevant for the private sector production function.
23 They are classified as 
productive if they are expected to impact the private sector’s production function.
24 If not, 
they are named as unproductive, meaning that government financing in those sectors is 
expected to be less relevant for the decision-making of private investors:
25  
 
Productive expenditure: General public services; Defense; Education; Health; 
Housing; and Transportation and communication. 
                                                                                                                                                 
profitability of infrastructure investments since they can facilitate access and prevent accidents, permitting 
citizens to arrive safely to markets, schools, hospitals or any other destinations. Similarly, salaries of 
teachers, usually classified under the current spending rubric, are closely connected to the quality of 
education provided. In addition, it would not be realistic to try and isolate public investments completely 
since in many countries capital budgets include de facto, explicitly or implicitly, salaries and current 
spending items. 
22See Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007), Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and Benos (2009).    
23 See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003). 
24 See Section V.3 for a slightly different classification that includes energy and excludes defense from 
productive spending. 
25 It should be noted that all types of spending items classified as productive may not be fully productive. 
But, due to the lack of detailed, cross-country data on spending items, we need to execute this way of 
classification.   12 
 
Unproductive expenditure: Social security and welfare; Recreation; Fuel and 
energy; Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; Mining and mineral resources; 
Manufacturing and construction; and Other economic affairs and services. 
 
In this case, the empirical specification becomes:
26   
 
; Pr ˆ ˆ 8 7 1 6 1 5 4 3 2 1 1 CPIINF b FS b UnproExp b oExp b FR b HC b p b y b y it it it it i it it it           
 
  
where ProExp is the productive expenditure in percent of GDP and UnproExp is the 




IV.3. Empirical Specification Capturing Differences in the Two Groups of Countries 
 
In an alternative empirical specification which is used with the pooled dataset which 
includes all countries in the study, interactive dummy variables are introduced to capture 
possible differences between fast-growing countries and the comparison group: 
 
1 6 1 5 4 3 2 1 1 * * ˆ ˆ          it it it i it it it PE DCOMP b PE DFAST b FR b HC b p b y b y  
 




DFAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast-growing countries and 0 otherwise, 
DCOMP is the dummy variable which is 1 for the other countries and 0 otherwise. 
 
The multiplication of these dummy variables with public expenditure produces the 
interactive variables that capture the possible impact of public expenditure on growth for 
the two separate groups.  
 
IV.4. Nonlinear Empirical Specification 
 
In a dynamic setting and using recent econometric techniques, we also try to estimate 
possible nonlinear effects of public expenditure on growth in fast-growing countries 
versus the comparison group.
28 The nonlinear empirical specification with and without 
interactive dummy variables capturing group effects is: 
 
; ˆ ˆ 8 7 1
2
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26 See Footnote 22. 
27 Alternatively, we also use “core” and “non-core” spending in the regressions for robustness check. 
28 As specified by Barro (1990), and as discussed earlier, the nonlinearity in the impact of public 
expenditure on growth can be significant to understand the link between these two variables.  13 
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where the square terms of total, productive, or “core” components of government 
expenditure capture the nonlinearity.
29 
 
IV.5. Econometric Methodology 
 
Three alternative econometric methods for panel data are used (OLS, SURE, and GMM) 
and their results are then compared.
30 For each empirical specification, the first sets of 
results are obtained using OLS and/or SURE methods. Then, a dynamic panel technique 
(GMM) is applied and the results are compared with those obtained with the static panel 
regressions. In the empirical analysis, annual data are used, thus basically the focus is on 




OLS and SURE methods are based on the assumption that the right-hand-side variables 
are exogenous. But it is quite likely that these variables may not be because they can be 
determined by each other, or by the growth rate, or by other variables that are not 
controlled for in the empirical specifications. The GMM dynamic panel method is used to 
allow for a more rigorous treatment of the endogeneity of public spending with respect to 
growth in order to have more reliable and precise results.
33 More specifically, we use a 
two-step GMM methodology which requires taking the first differences of the variables. 
Since a set of instrumental variables is introduced with the GMM technique, it helps us 
control for possible endogeneity among regressors. 
 
In the regressions, the set of instruments consists of lagged values of dependent and 
independent variables. The complete set of instrumental variables is:  
 
  the second and third lags of the growth rate of GDP per capita, initial human 
capital (or initial life expectancy or initial GDP per capita),  
                                                 
29 The dummy variables (DFAST and DCOMP, as defined above) control for the group effects. Of course, 
there could also be nonlinearities related to other variables, most particularly private investment or 
differences in inflation; it could be, for instance, that countries in the fast-growing group also have higher 
rates of private investment and better macroeconomic policies. However, given the size of our sample, and 
the issue at hand, we limit ourselves to studying nonlinearities associated with government spending. 
30 See Moreno-Dodson (2008) for a detailed description of the three methods. 
31 The SURE methodology used in the paper is a type of OLS technique which can be estimated to account 
for various patterns of correlation among the residuals.
 In the paper, the variance structure introduced by 
the SURE methodology is cross-section specific heteroskedasticity. This methodology is used to check 
whether or not our results with ordinary least square change when we introduced cross-section specific 
heteroskedasticity, given that the countries in the data set are expected to have different characteristics. 
32 For robustness check, we also run the empirical specifications with 3-year moving averages (medium-
term impacts). Table A2 in Appendix reproduces Table 5 with 3-year moving averages instead of annual 
data. This table confirms the robustness of the initial regression results. 
33 The dynamic general method of moments (GMM) was introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991). As 
indicated in the next section, OLS and SURE methodologies produce similar results, and GMM confirms 
most of them. 14 
 
  the first, second, and third lags of private investment in percent of GDP,  
  the second and third lags of tax revenue, total public expenditure or 
productive expenditure, unproductive expenditure, all in percent of GDP, 
  the first, second, and third lags of other revenue and budget balance, all as a 
share of GDP, and 
  the first and second lags of the inflation rate. 
 
 
V.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
Each empirical specification introduced in the previous section is run in four different 
settings, using the three econometric methods defined in the previous section. The first 
set of empirical estimations presented in the first column of the tables is for fast-growing 
countries.
34 The second set of results (see the second column of the tables) is for the 
comparison group. The third set of results, presented in the third column of the tables, is 
obtained by combining the two groups of countries in a panel data setting. Then the 
fourth set of results, as presented in the last column of the tables, is obtained again by not 
only combining all countries in a single dataset, but also introducing interactive dummy 
variables for public expenditure to control for possible group effects. 
 
The overall results suggest that total public spending, especially its productive and “core” 
components, has indeed a statistically significant, positive impact on the GDP per capita 
growth rate for fast-growing countries, while a similar link cannot be established robustly 
for the comparison group.  
 
V.1. Linear Regression Results 
 
1.1 Total Public Spending 
 
The linear regression specifications involve public spending and its components as 
percent of GDP, ignoring any higher order variables. First we include total public 
spending in the regressions. One common finding is that the differences in the size of 
estimated coefficients for the fast-growing group versus the comparison group, as well as 
their level of statistical significance, are both large.  
 
Table 3 presents the first set of results obtained with both OLS and SURE methodologies. 
For the fast-growing countries in our dataset (first two columns in Table 3), all the 
estimated coefficients of government budget components including public spending are 
statistically and economically significant determinants of economic growth at 1 percent 
significance level. Both OLS and SURE results produce the same results. However, we 
do not see similar results for the comparison group (columns 3 and 4 in Table 3). Only 
the budget surplus has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 5 
percent level. The impact of public spending on GDP per capita growth is positive, but 
                                                 
34 It should be noted that these first sets of results are the ones also presented in Moreno-Dodson (2008) 
since we use the same fast growing countries in our analyses. 15 
 
the coefficient is not significant using neither OLS nor SURE methodologies. Similarly, 
total fiscal revenue as a share of GDP does not have any significant impact on growth.
35  
 
When we compare the magnitudes of the coefficients, they are much larger for the first 
group, indicating the importance of budget components on economic development. For 
example, a 1-percentage increase in the public spending to GDP ratio leads to almost half 
a percent increase in GDP per capita growth rates for the fast-growing group, while the 
same increase in spending causes only a 0.04 percent increase in GDP per capita growth 
in the comparison group.  
 
Although the focus of this paper is on the link between public spending and growth, it is 
also critical to acknowledge the contribution of private investment. As indicated in Table 
3, the empirical results state that private investment is significant only for the fast-
growing group.  
 
Similarly, inflation, which is included to capture the impact of macroeconomic stability 
on growth, is a statistically significant determinant of growth (with a negative coefficient) 
only for the fast-growing group. 
 
The other interesting result is that when we combine the two sets together, the economic 
and statistical significance of total public expenditure in determining growth drops 
substantially. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 3 show the results when two country groups are 
combined in one dataset. In this case, the coefficient of total public spending is 
significant only at 10 percent and only with the SURE methodology. The magnitude of 
the coefficients is much smaller compared to the ones produced only for fast-growing 
countries (columns 1 and 2 in Table 3). Other components of the budget – fiscal revenue 
and budget surplus – are significant at 10 and 5 percent, respectively.
36 Private 
investment continues to have a statistically significant coefficient at the 1 percent level.  
 
These results lead us to interpret that when more heterogeneous countries (in terms of 
their growth performance) are all included in the dataset, the significance of public 
spending and other budget components drops. This may partially explain why some 
empirical studies in the literature mixing countries with very different growth patterns 
cannot find a statistically significant link between government spending and economic 
growth. In other words, in order to avoid parameter bias in cross-country regression 
results, distinguishing “clusters” by either specific growth characteristics and 
performance, or more formal pooling tests, can be critical. 
 
As explained in the empirical specification section of the paper, the interactive dummy 
variables are introduced to capture the possible differences between the two groups in 
terms of the impact of public expenditure on growth when the two groups are combined 
in one set. The interactive dummy variable for the fast-growing countries (DFAST × 
                                                 
35The lack of significance or robustness of the initial human capital variable may be due to the fact that the 
indicator that we use does not capture quality differences well across countries and over time; see Rogers 
(2008) for a more detailed discussion. 
36 This finding supports the results presented in Lee and Gordon (2005). 16 
 
public spending) has an economically and statistically significant coefficient at 5 percent 
with OLS, while the similar interactive dummy variable for the comparison group leads 
to a lower estimated coefficient and statistical significance (see columns 7 and 8 in Table 
3).  
 
The results in this setting clearly suggest that the impact of total public expenditures on 
growth is much more significant for fast-growing countries, after controlling for other 
variables and budget components.  
 
The estimated coefficients using OLS and SURE methodology are confirmed also by a 
dynamic GMM methodology as presented in Table 4. Total fiscal spending is again a 
statistically and economically significant determinant of growth for the fast-growing 
group (see column 1). Inflation also has the expected sign and statistically significant 
coefficients at 1 percent level. Openness, which is included to capture possible effects of 
private sector transactions on growth through exports and imports (instead of private 
investment), and is expected to have a positive impact on growth, has indeed a 
statistically significant coefficient at 1 percent level.
37  
 
None of the variables are statistically significant in the case of the comparison group, 
except inflation (see column 2). Total public spending even has an unexpected negative 
impact on growth, but it is not statistically significant. The insignificant coefficient of 
openness for the comparison group again shows that exports and imports are not 
successful in explaining growth in those countries. 
 
When the two sets are combined, the significance of total public spending in determining 
growth disappears and the sign of the variable even turns negative. But when the group 
effects in the combined data setting are controlled with the interactive dummies of total 
fiscal spending, it can be seen that the fast-growing group has a statistically significant 
public spending impact on growth, while the influence of public spending on growth in 
the comparison group is negative (see column 4).   
 
1.2. Expenditure Classifications: Productive versus Unproductive 
 
The remaining question is how the impact of different components of public spending on 
growth varies in these two groups of countries. The first classification of public spending 
considers productive versus unproductive public spending, a priori, as explained in the 
previous section.  
 
According to this definition, the productive component of public spending is expected to 
have a higher impact on growth when compared to the unproductive component. When 
we focus on fast-growing countries, the result is confirmed (column 1 in Table 5). In an 
empirical specification where we control for some macroeconomic variables and lagged 
value of growth, fiscal revenue and budget balance, productive public spending has a 
                                                 
37 In each GMM specification, we include openness instead of private investment since this variable 
produces better results. 17 
 
higher impact on growth in the fast-growing group, while it has a negative but 
insignificant impact for the comparison group (compare columns 1 and 2 in Table 5). 
 
Column 3 of Table 5 shows that productive expenditure gets insignificant in explaining 
growth in the pooled sample, again illustrating the caveats of pooling a disparate group of 
developing countries. The estimation result with the interactive dummies for the two 
groups, as presented in column 4 of Table 5, also supports the previous findings: the 
coefficient of the interactive dummy variable for productive expenditure in the fast-
growing group is statistically significant at 1 percent, while the one in the comparison 
group is not significant.  
 
The estimation results based on the dynamic GMM technique are given in Table 6. Since 
they are similar to the previous results obtained with the panel OLS methodology (Table 
5), we conclude that the findings are robust across different econometric methods. Again, 
for fast-growing countries, productive public spending has a positive and statistically 
significant impact at 10 percent on growth.
38 The sign of the non-productive component 
for the fast-growing group becomes negative in the GMM specifications, but it does not 
have any statistically significant influence on growth.
39 Openness continues to have a 
statistically significant impact on growth at the 10 percent level.  
 
The comparison group, on the other hand, does not present any significant coefficient for 
any component of government spending. The unproductive component of government 
spending continues to produce statistically insignificant coefficients.  
 
When we combine the two groups in one set, the sign of productive public expenditure is 
positive and its significance is close to 10 percent. The unproductive component turns out 
to have a statistically significant, negative sign in the GMM specification. When we 
separate the effects of two groups in the combined dataset with the interactive dummy 
variables (Column 4 in Table 6), it can be seen that the positive impact of productive 
public spending on growth in the combined set is confirmed only for the fast-growing 
country group, as it was the case with OLS.   
 
 V.2. Nonlinear Regression Results 
 
As argued by Barro (1990, 1991), the link between public spending and growth is 
expected to be positive when the size of government is small, but it may become negative 
as the size gets larger.
40 To capture nonlinearity, an additional explanatory variable is 
introduced in the specification: either the squared value of total public spending or the 
squared term of productive public spending. First the OLS panel regression methodology 
                                                 
38 This significance is lower than the one reported in Table 5. 
39 It was positively significant at 10 percent in Table 5 which is based on the OLS technique. 
40 There are many other papers focusing on a possible nonlinearity between government spending and 
growth. In addition to Barro (1990 and 1991), Grossman (1988) examines a nonlinear relationship between 
growth in the size of government and overall growth in the economy. When compared with previous 
studies, we focus on the nonlinear analysis, considering a dynamic setting where the overall budget 
constraint is also taken into account. 
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is used to test nonlinearity. Then we also use the dynamic GMM methodology to confirm 
the results.   
 
Table 7 presents the coefficients estimated by the panel OLS methodology, where total 
public spending is considered. In none of the specifications, neither total public 
expenditure nor its squared term has a statistically significant effect on growth. This 
result is consistent across the two country groups as well as for the combined set. When 
we control for the group effects with the help of the interactive dummy variables in the 
combined set, not much difference is observed. These findings do not change with any 
alternative econometric technique. Table 8 shows the same specifications estimated this 
time with the GMM technique. The results are robust: total public expenditure and its 
squared term again are not significant in any column of Table 8. 
 
As presented previously, the empirical results in the linear setting suggest that some 
components of public spending are more influential in determining the growth rate of 
GDP per capita. Thus, we expect that the inclusion of those components of public 
spending instead of total public spending can matter in the nonlinear setting as well. 
Table 9 shows the estimated coefficients with the level and the squared value of 
productive public expenditure, calculated using panel OLS estimation technique. As it 
was the case before, the productive component of government spending is a statistically 
significant determinant of the growth rate of GDP per capita only for fast-growing 
countries. The squared value of productive expenditures has a negative sign, but it is not 
statistically significant. Table 10, which uses the GMM estimation technique, confirms 
the results presented in Table 9. Similarly, the productive component is significant only 
for fast-growing countries, while the squared value of this variable is not statistically 
significant in any case.  
 
Overall the results based on the nonlinear specifications do not identify any nonlinearity 
between either total public spending, or its productive component, and economic growth.  
 
V.3. Robustness Check of the Classification of Public Spending 
 
The inclusion of defense spending item in the a priori definition of productive public 
spending raises some important questions in the context of developing countries. There is 
still a controversy in the literature on whether defense spending promotes economic 
growth. For example, Benoit (1973 and 1978) explains that defense expenditures can 
increase growth through providing education and health services to staff in the military, 
lowering unemployment, engaging in public works, and increasing scientific and 
technological innovations. It may also promote growth by providing a more secure 
environment for private investors. However, another group of papers, such as Biswas and 
Ram (1986) and Looney and Frederiksen (1986), argues that the relationship between 
defense spending and growth is not robust across different countries.  
 
Since we, as economists, do not have any knowledge of the defense sector and in order to 
test the robustness of the empirical results to alternative classifications, we rerun our 
regressions using an alternative definition named as “core” spending which excludes 19 
 
defense spending from the a priori definition of productive public spending and, instead, 
includes public expenditures on fuel and energy, which are proven to be critical for 
growth in most developing countries, and often influence decision making by private 
investors.  
 
“Non-core” spending includes social security and welfare; recreational, cultural and 
religious affairs; agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting; mining and mineral resources, 
manufacturing and construction; and other economic affairs and services.  
 
Defense spending is added to “other” public spending and therefore excluded from the 
regressions, given our lack of knowledge of the sector.  
 
Table 11 shows the empirical results with this alternative definition of a priori “core” 
public spending. When we compare the results in Table 11 with the ones in Table 5, we 
can see that the original results are robust. The “core” spending is again a statistically and 
economically significant determinant of growth only for the fast-growing group. It is not 
significant for the comparison group, or when we pool all countries together. Moreover, 
this robustness test leads us to conclude a posteriori that “core” public spending is a 
positive determinant of growth in the group of fast-growing countries. 
 
Table 12 presents the estimated coefficients calculated, this time using the GMM 
methodology in the previous sections. The results are consistent with the ones presented 
in Table 11. The “core” component of public spending is significant only for the fast-
growing group. Similarly, openness is statistically significant only in this group. The 
inflation rate consistently produces a negative and highly significant coefficient in each 
specification.  
 
The nonlinear results presented in the previous section are also robust to the new 
definition of “core” spending (Table 13). Again, the nonlinear term, the squared term of 
“core” spending, does not have a statistically significant coefficient in any specification 
and the linear term of “core” spending is statistically significant only for the fast-growing 
countries. This indicates the absence of the nonlinear relationship between growth and 
public spending in our dataset.  
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the link between GDP per 
capita growth and public spending components with the help of a panel dataset where 
developing countries are classified in two groups according to their GDP per capita 
growth rates for over three decades: fast-growing countries and a comparison group 
including a mix of countries with different growth patterns (a lower growth rate on 
average and more volatile growth paths).  
 
The main result of the study is that the influence of public spending on economic growth 
is clearly different between the two groups, even though the size of government, 
measured as total public expenditures in percent of GDP, is similar. A priori, a possible 20 
 
explanation may be found in the composition of public expenditure. The fast-growing 
group has higher shares of productive and “core” public expenditure on average. They 
also have higher productivity ratios and better governance indexes.
41  
 
A posteriori, for the fast-growing countries, both productive and “core” components of 
public spending consistently have a joint positive and statistically significant impact on 
economic growth, after controlling for macroeconomic and private sector variables, 
initial conditions of countries, and other budget components. This statistically significant 
effect cannot be established in a robust fashion for the comparison group. Our results are 
consistent with several other studies focusing on developed and developing countries, 
such as Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007), and Benos (2009).
42 
 
In addition to the differences that we observe in the response of growth to the 
composition of public spending between the two groups of countries, we also find 
differences in the impact of macroeconomic stability and the private sector on growth. 
Inflation is negatively correlated with growth mainly for the fast-growing group and the 
combined set, indicating that reducing inflation leads to faster growth for these countries 
and therefore growth is more responsive to improvements in macroeconomic stability. 
The two alternative control variables used to capture private sector influence, private 
investment and openness, tend to have higher significance in explaining growth for the 
fast-growing group, which points out to the existence of an economic policy environment 
more conducive to growth and a strong contribution from the private sector.
43  
 
Based on these results, we can say that after taking into account the negative effects of 
taxation (which raises public funds needed for its financing), public spending has a 
positive impact on growth through its productive and “core” components, in a policy 
environment where private sector investment, openness and macroeconomic stability are 
also conducive to growth. 
 
When we combine the two groups of countries in the regression analysis, the link 
between government spending and growth gets weaker or disappears. In these 
regressions, when we control the group effects by interactive dummy variables, it can be 
seen that only the fast-growing panel produces a positive and statistically significant link 
between both the productive and “core” components of public spending and growth.  
 
                                                 
41 Due to data limitations, we could not explicitly include governance variables in our regression, but some 
simple data analysis based on available data indicates that the quality of governance (as measured by 
government effectiveness and bureaucracy quality) is consistently higher for the fast-growing group. Thus, 
we believe that the group effects that are introduced in the empirical specification partially capture the 
quality of governance. 
42For dissenting results, however, see Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008). 
43 As a possible research idea for future work, it would be interesting to explore the complementarity 
existing between public spending and public sector investments.  Based on qualitative assessments, in the 
fast growing it is observed group that private sector investments played a critical role in determining and 
sustaining high growth rates and also in triggering an appropriate response from the public sector in order 
to adapt to and complement private investors.   21 
 
Our overall conclusion therefore is that public spending can be a significant determinant 
of growth through its productive and “core” components, which are also likely to impact 
the production function of the private sector. Another outcome of the analysis is that 
inconsistent results in previous empirical analyses that linked public spending and 
economic growth may be explained by the selection of countries included. 
  
These results have important implications for the current debate about the design of fiscal 
rules in a growth context. Many developing countries, under a “Golden Rule” approach, 
are trying to maintain a balance or surplus in their current spending budget while capital 
spending is being financed increasingly by borrowing.
44 In addition to the creative 
accounting, negative incentives and budget fragmentation distortions that this can 
trigger,
45 this rule does not take into account possible interactions among sectoral 
categories of public spending regardless of whether they correspond to capital or current 
items.  
 
Our analysis indicates that, the bulk of public expenditures in productive and “core” 
sectors, which consist of a combination of current and capital spending on infrastructure, 
health, education, and other economic sectors that are critical for development, can have 
a significant joint impact on growth. For policy makers, this result implies that planning 
and executing public spending in those sectors in an integrated manner, taking into 
account inter-linkages among them and their current and capital components, should be 
conducive to growth.     
 
It is important, however, to notice that, in order to be able to draw recommendations 
regarding the composition of public spending at the country level in connection with 
growth, the conclusions of this cross-country study should be followed by additional 
individual country empirical studies which should consider country specific 
characteristics affecting the public spending composition as well as other determinants of 
growth.  
 
The definitions of productive and “core” spending suggested in this paper should be, 
therefore, tailored and adapted at the individual country level. For example, in a country 
where agriculture still represents a high percentage of total GDP, public spending in 
irrigation, rural infrastructure, and rural energy should be considered a priori as “core”, 
while in other countries heavily dependent on exports of mineral products and energy, 
public funds allocated to that sector should be included a priori in the “core” spending 
group. 
 
                                                 
44 More precisely, under the Blanchard-Giavazzi rule, governments should borrow in net terms on a 
continuous basis only to the extent that this net borrowing finances net public investment, that is, gross 
investment less capital depreciation (which counts as current spending). This rule therefore would allow 
gross borrowing for the purpose of refinancing maturing debt, thereby leaving net debt unaffected. 
45 It is possible that some public investments, for example in hospitals or in schools, may be fully funded 
without the current expenses for staff, operations and maintenance. Given that these current expenses are 
essential to ensure the good functioning of capital goods, absence of such current expenditures 
complementing capital spending may result in a liability for the country in the end, with doubtful effects on 
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Fast growing countries: Botswana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Singapore, 
Thailand. 
Comparison group: Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines, Turkey, Uruguay and 
Venezuela 
 
YEARS INCLUDED BY COUNTRIES 
 
The years included are according to the data availability of government budget items. 
 
Botswana: 1970-96 and 2001-2005 
Indonesia: 1972-1999 and 2001-2005 
Korea: 1970-97 and 2001-2005 













LIST OF VARIABLES 
 
1. Control Variables 
 
Private Investment: Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector includes land 
improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, including schools, 
offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and industrial buildings.  
Source: WDI and IFC working paper. 
 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP): Imports of goods and services represent the 
value of all goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They 
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license 
fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, 
business, personal, and government services. They exclude labor and property income 
(formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. 
Source: WDI. 27 
 
 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP): Exports of goods and services represent the 
value of all goods and other market services provided to the rest of the world. They 
include the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license 
fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, 
business, personal, and government services. They exclude labor and property income 
(formerly called factor services) as well as transfer payments. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Openness (% of GDP): Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) plus imports of 
goods and services (% of GDP). 
 
Bureaucracy Quality Index: Indexed series between 1 and 4 measuring the quality of 
bureaucracy. Higher numbers indicate higher quality.  
Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
 
2. Initial Condition Variables 
 
GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollar: GDP per capita is gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in 
constant U.S. dollars. 
Source: WDI. 
 
Initial Human Index: Following Bose, Haque, and Osborn (2007), we construct the 
initial human capital variable as the weighted sum of the initial enrolment ratios (%) in 
primary and secondary schools and in higher education. The weights are 1 for primary 
school enrolment ratio, 2 for secondary school and 3 for enrolment in higher education. 
The weights are approximations to the relative values of three types of education. The 
initial year is 1970. 
Source: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, 1999). 
 
3. Government Budget Items 
 
Tax Revenue: Tax revenue refers to compulsory transfers to the central government for 
public purposes. Certain compulsory transfers such as fines, penalties, and most social 
security contributions are excluded. Refunds and corrections of erroneously collected tax 
revenue are treated as negative revenue. For central government. 
Source: GFS. 
 
Total Government Revenue: Revenue is cash receipts from taxes, social contributions, 
and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales. Grants are 
also excluded here. For central government. 
Source: GFS. 28 
 
 
Other Revenue: Total government revenue minus tax revenues. For central government. 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Total Government expenditure: Total central government expenditure: economic plus 
social, plus general public services, plus defense, plus other expenditure. 
Source: GFS. 
 
Budget balance: Before 2001, it is calculated as total government revenue plus grants 
minus total expenditure minus net lending. After 2001, it is total revenue plus grants 
minus total expenditure. For central government. 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Productive expenditure:  





Transportation and communication expenditure 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Unproductive expenditure: 
Social security and welfare expenditure 
Expenditure on recreation 
Expenditure on fuel and energy 
Expenditure on agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
Expenditure on mining, mineral resources, manufacturing, and construction 
Expenditure on other economic affairs and services 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
Other expenditure (for productive versus unproductive classification): 
Public order and safety 
Other expenditures 
Source: Calculated by author. 
 
“Core” spending:  




Transportation and communication expenditure 
Expenditure on fuel and energy 




Social security and welfare 
Recreational, cultural and religious affairs 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 
Mining and mineral resources, manufacturing and construction 
Other economic affairs and services 
Source: Calculated by author. 
Other expenditure (for core versus non-core classification): 
Public order and safety 
Other expenditures 
Defense expenditures 





In order to give some initial idea about the possible links between public spending and its 
components and economic growth, a simple correlation coefficient matrix is presented in 
Table A.1. The correlation may change in the dynamic settings of the econometric 
analysis, but overall we can see that the simple relationship between GDP per capita 
growth and public expenditure (and its components) is much weaker and even negative in 
some cases for the second group of countries. For the first group, the highest correlation 
coefficients for growth belong to productive expenditures, economic expenditures, and 
transportation expenditures. All these correlation coefficients are negative but close to 
zero for the second group, indicating almost no correlation between the components of 










balance/GDP Pro/TEXP Soc/TEXP Eco/TEXP Edu/TEXP Hea/TEXP TRA/TEXP CORE/TEXP
GDPPCGR 1.00
Pub spending/GDP 0.13 1.00
Fiscal balance/GDP 0.09 ‐0.07 1.00
Pro/TEXP 0.33 ‐0.04 0.49 1.00
Soc/TEXP ‐0.23 0.30 0.04 0.34 1.00
Eco/TEXP 0.22 0.00 ‐0.11 0.43 0.04 1.00
Edu/TEXP 0.00 0.23 0.27 0.59 0.39 0.05 1.00
Hea/TEXP ‐0.04 0.40 ‐0.14 0.18 0.72 ‐0.16 0.49 1.00
TRA/TEXP 0.38 0.10 0.04 0.46 0.02 0.88 0.14 ‐0.05 1.00







balance/GDP Pro/TEXP Soc/TEXP Eco/TEXP Edu/TEXP Hea/TEXP TRA/TEXP CORE/TEXP
GDPPCGR 1.00
Pub spending/GDP ‐0.04 1.00
Fiscal balance/GDP ‐0.21 ‐0.40 1.00
Pro/TEXP ‐0.06 ‐0.54 0.39 1.00
Soc/TEXP 0.16 0.30 0.27 ‐0.24 1.00
Eco/TEXP ‐0.05 ‐0.61 0.24 0.60 ‐0.58 1.00
Edu/TEXP 0.01 ‐0.56 0.29 0.48 0.00 0.18 1.00
Hea/TEXP ‐0.03 0.01 0.28 0.28 0.54 ‐0.21 0.31 1.00
TRA/TEXP 0.00 ‐0.57 0.26 0.68 ‐0.38 0.88 0.25 ‐0.04 1.00


















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private investment -0.035 -0.023 0.004 -0.040
(% of GDP) (-1.2) (-0.361) (0.143) (-1.437)
Initial human capital 0.005 -0.003 -0.004 0.001
(1.536) (-0.614) (-1.361) (0.259)
Tax revenue -0.182 -0.025 0.004 -0.042
(% of GDP) (-2.981)*** (-0.372) (0.093) (-0.913)
Other revenue -0.312 -0.206 -0.073 -0.129
(% of GDP) (-4.164)*** (-1.934)* (-1.819)* (-3.286)***
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.429 0.004 0.059 …
(% of GDP) (4.807)*** (0.096) (1.671)*
DFAST*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.136
(% of GDP) (3.643)***
DCOMP*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.010
(% of GDP) (0.165)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.267 0.008 -0.013 0.007
(% of GDP) (2.827)*** (0.141) (-0.301) (0.153)
Budget surplus  0.260 0.161 0.072 0.126
(% of GDP) (4.26)*** (2.393)** (1.928)* (3.146)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.095 0.006 -0.002 0.004
(-4.122)*** (0.936) (-0.378) (0.72)
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.833 0.750 0.811 0.784
(12.681)*** (12.883)*** (18.484)*** (17.996)***
No. of observations 132 176 308 308
Adjusted R2 0.739 0.566 0.718 0.73
Table A2: Results with 3-year Moving Averages                             
(panel OLS, reproduce Table 5)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. 3-year  moving average data are used. (-1) 
indicates variables lagged one period. D-FAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 
otherwise. DCOMP is the dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given 
in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% 













GDP Pro/TEXP Soc/TEXP Eco/TEXP Edu/TEXP Hea/TEXP TRA/TEXP CORE/TEXP
Botswana 1970‐79 11.93 28.37 ‐5.03 76.61 35.67 31.37 16.54 5.66 13.71 75.39
Botswana 1980‐89 8.00 32.53 9.65 68.87 35.59 26.32 19.23 5.52 9.92 63.39
Botswana 1990‐99 3.74 36.91 7.60 74.11 44.31 15.46 23.01 5.22 6.76 53.05
Botswana 2000‐05 5.60 38.83 0.53 23.52 8.48 32.00
Indonesia 1970‐79 5.31 18.36 ‐3.35 62.79 34.55 8.42 2.03 12.24 45.27
Indonesia 1980‐89 4.41 21.17 ‐3.59 63.20 31.49 9.15 2.18 9.83 58.05
Indonesia 1990‐99 3.26 17.23 ‐0.85 53.02 35.68 22.70 8.72 2.54 7.35 49.42
Indonesia 2000‐05 3.37 18.33 ‐1.31
Korea, Rep. 1970‐79 6.32 15.48 ‐0.79 68.33 24.67 21.28 16.21 1.29 5.47 39.52
Korea, Rep. 1980‐89 6.38 15.91 0.19 65.52 28.83 16.05 18.66 1.65 3.77 36.09
Korea, Rep. 1990‐99 5.24 16.39 1.21 55.99 33.12 20.44 18.90 1.04 5.94 37.51
Korea, Rep. 2000‐05 4.60 20.71 1.83 59.87 35.01 15.38 0.45 6.67 47.51
Malaysia 1970‐79 5.18 23.70 ‐6.33 58.93 34.74 15.96 22.45 6.71 5.87 42.44
Malaysia 1980‐89 3.18 30.58 ‐9.55 57.90 31.49 29.49 18.80 4.85 8.36 48.00
Malaysia 1990‐99 4.52 24.23 60.92 20.95 5.85 8.02 50.36
Malaysia 2000‐05 3.15 26.99 ‐6.48 61.09 24.60 7.06 8.03 52.58
Mauritius 1970‐79 30.16 ‐11.28 51.42 47.68 16.46 14.10 8.50 4.30 52.54
Mauritius 1980‐89 4.90 26.81 ‐6.62 46.29 43.36 14.96 14.86 7.78 4.50 45.50
Mauritius 1990‐99 4.24 23.59 ‐3.26 45.85 48.97 14.43 15.95 8.56 4.37 44.62
Mauritius 2000‐05 3.15 24.36 ‐3.32 52.89 52.34 15.07 15.74 8.70 3.40 52.21
Singapore 1970‐79 7.55 18.07 0.87 79.37 33.78 10.62 16.74 7.89 5.31 49.91
Singapore 1980‐89 5.32 24.99 2.68 71.59 34.96 15.34 18.62 5.72 8.01 50.83
Singapore 1990‐99 4.39 15.60 7.80 90.26 46.13 24.24 7.67 6.02 59.09
Singapore 2000‐05 3.44 16.58 4.73 91.49 51.17 23.70 6.65 7.82 56.58
Thailand 1970‐79 4.83 15.49 ‐2.71 62.21 32.15 23.25 20.70 4.11 10.29 43.76
Thailand 1980‐89 5.48 18.39 ‐3.53 57.40 30.41 22.24 19.64 5.41 7.02 40.28
Thailand 1990‐99 3.99 17.61 ‐0.25 61.35 36.12 30.92 20.38 7.51 11.28 48.94
Thailand 2000‐05 4.08 19.59 ‐3.41 59.96 43.09 24.03 21.30 8.97 7.11 55.74


















GDP Pro/TEXP Soc/TEXP Eco/TEXP Edu/TEXP Hea/TEXP TRA/TEXP CORE/TEXP
Chile 1970‐79 0.86 33.20 ‐1.85 58.77 53.82 15.15 14.24 7.41 4.75 46.66
Chile 1980‐89 2.72 28.29 ‐0.51 50.04 62.77 9.21 13.41 7.23 3.29 38.35
Chile 1990‐99 4.66 19.79 1.21 65.68 14.62 11.47
Chile 2000‐05 3.09 14.73 0.02 70.94 18.02 12.54
Costa Rica 1970‐79 3.70 20.18 ‐2.75 67.87 62.75 19.89 28.00 9.32 14.51 64.97
Costa Rica 1980‐89 ‐0.46 20.01 ‐2.02 70.40 64.19 15.99 20.14 25.26 9.67 68.09
Costa Rica 1990‐99 2.90 21.37 ‐1.62 54.62 63.12 10.25 19.18 23.20 4.84 54.96
Costa Rica 2000‐05 1.69 22.91 ‐1.26 53.15 67.04 10.69 20.98 22.03 6.10 53.15
Mexico 1970‐79 3.33 14.53 ‐2.48 41.47 45.88 33.44 17.92 4.28 9.50 40.39
Mexico 1980‐89 0.12 23.21 ‐7.85 31.65 28.36 22.48 12.97 1.58 5.03 32.48
Mexico 1990‐99 1.66 15.44 ‐0.69 43.54 50.38 14.55 23.37 3.25 4.23 41.06
Mexico 2000‐05 1.49 15.93 ‐1.17 48.53 57.28 8.11 24.73 4.95 2.32 46.87
Philippines 1970‐79 2.90 13.86 0.20 70.39 24.07 43.28 14.53 4.42 17.15 56.13
Philippines 1980‐89 ‐0.45 13.70 ‐0.42 73.91 27.06 45.55 17.23 5.01 21.18 67.05
Philippines 1990‐99 0.53 18.98 ‐0.91 50.69 25.36 22.85 17.57 3.17 11.08 43.89
Philippines 2000‐05 2.57 19.35 ‐3.92 38.94 25.23 14.86 17.95 2.10 8.54 34.28
Turkey 1970‐79 2.28 18.64 ‐2.02 66.64 27.14 43.23 19.50 2.98 15.46 62.65
Turkey 1980‐89 1.70 17.44 ‐3.35 71.98 19.67 26.07 13.10 2.25 8.20 65.39
Turkey 1990‐99 2.03 18.35 ‐4.59 59.12 24.91 14.94 14.49 3.28 5.11 52.87
Turkey 2000‐05 3.60 33.14 ‐11.18 26.38 21.53 7.98 8.78 3.24 2.32 20.50
Uruguay 1970‐79 2.33 23.18 ‐1.73 45.95 61.96 10.18 10.64 4.19 5.20 37.30
Uruguay 1980‐89 0.07 25.23 ‐2.46 38.62 62.79 9.08 7.34 4.14 6.29 27.93
Uruguay 1990‐99 2.60 28.89 ‐0.93 28.51 72.45 7.42 6.91 5.49 4.45 22.84
Uruguay 2000‐05 0.71 31.41 ‐4.05 26.06 74.73 5.56 7.33 6.17 2.89 22.68
Venezuela 1970‐79 0.45 19.44 4.26 54.77 36.55 28.94 16.47 9.99 9.75 51.24
Venezuela 1980‐89 ‐2.89 21.93 1.94 49.30 39.61 21.47 18.55 8.62 6.19 45.92
Venezuela 1990‐99 0.30 20.21 0.11 41.52 41.80 4.72 17.03 7.05 2.38 35.95
Venezuela 2000‐05 1.35 24.07 ‐2.62 49.34 46.74 6.98 21.22 6.65 2.69 44.43



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness 0.062 -0.006 0.005 -0.004
(% of GDP) (6.032)*** (-0.073) (0.141) (-0.123)
Total fiscal revenue -0.207 -0.136 0.686 1.773
(% of GDP) (-0.662) (-0.146) (0.94) (1.523)
Total fiscal expenditures (-1) 0.318 -0.326 -0.019 …
(% of GDP) (1.572)* (-1.091) (-0.117)
DFAST*(Total fiscal expenditures (-1)) … … … 1.698
(% of GDP) (1.856)*
DCOMP*(Total fiscal expenditures (-1)) … … … -0.918
(% of GDP) (-1.72)*
Budget surplus  -0.020 0.281 -0.164 -0.946
(% of GDP) (-0.097) (0.275) (-0.321) (-1.479)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.492 -0.056 -0.086 -0.088
(-6.579)*** (-4.782)*** (-6.756)*** (-3.671)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.125 -0.092 -0.089 -0.006
(0.906) (-1.675)* (-0.807) (-0.031)
No. of observations 94 169 264 264
Overidentification statistics 7.542 2.461 2.001 1.301
Table 4: Results with Total Public Expenditures (Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one 
period. DFAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the dummy 
variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% 
significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance 
levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. Overidentification 














(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private investment 0.071 0.111 0.154 0.086
(% of GDP) (1.235) (0.975) (3.244)*** (1.629)
Initial human capital 0.007 -0.015 -0.010 -0.005
(0.987) (-1.326) (-1.689)* (-0.747)
Tax revenue -0.201 -0.038 -0.023 -0.037
(% of GDP) (-1.877)* (-0.313) (-0.287) (-0.438)
Other revenue -0.531 -0.346 -0.144 -0.242
(% of GDP) (-4.051)*** (-1.548) (-1.853)* (-3.143)***
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.664 -0.051 0.048 …
(% of GDP) (4.314)*** (-0.574) (0.698)
DFAST*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.219
(% of GDP) (2.985)***
DCOMP*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.153
(% of GDP) (1.3)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.312 0.107 0.076 -0.060
(% of GDP) (1.786)* (0.944) (0.904) (-0.657)
Budget surplus  0.450 0.275 0.184 0.231
(% of GDP) (4.182)*** (2.318)** (2.571)** (3.106)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.208 -0.013 -0.023 -0.019
(-5.76)*** (-1.015) (-2.332)** (-1.813)*
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.377 0.255 0.284 0.264
(3.644)*** (3.181)*** (4.442)*** (4.169)***
No. of observations 120 167 287 287
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.101 0.312 0.327
Table 5: Results with Productive and Non-productive Expenditures (panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1)  indicates 
variables lagged one period. D-FAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. 
DCOMP is the dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in 
parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance 
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness 0.058 -0.348 0.047 -0.014
(% of GDP) (1.834)* (-1.335) (0.936) (-0.17)
Tax revenue -0.153 1.481 0.154 0.377
(% of GDP) (-0.355) (1.037) (0.22) (0.445)
Other revenue -0.400 -0.639 -0.374 -0.081
(% of GDP) (-0.905) (-0.26) (-0.504) (-0.089)
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.777 0.397 0.866 …
(% of GDP) (1.673)* (0.393) (1.513)
DFAST*Productive expenditure (-1) ………3 . 2 1 7
(% of GDP) (1.465)
DCOMP*Productive expenditure (-1) ………- 0 . 3 3 1
(% of GDP) (-0.263)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) -0.890 -1.187 -2.003 -2.181
(% of GDP) (-1.301) (-0.975) (-2.641)*** (-2.402)**
Budget surplus  0.126 0.115 -0.058 -0.017
(% of GDP) (0.316) (0.13) (-0.108) (-0.027)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.375 -0.105 -0.103 -0.116
(-3.12)*** (-2.743)*** (-2.972)*** (-2.735)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.03 -0.378 -0.382 -0.331
(-0.151) (-1.436) (-1.749)* (-1.27)
No. of observations 98 171 269 269
Overidentification statistics 1.993 2.07 6.97 3.75
Table 6: Results with Productive and Non-productive Expenditures 
(Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one 
period. DFAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the 
dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis.   * 
indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. 
These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficients. Overidentification statistics is for instrumental variables where  H0: there is no overidentification 
















Private investment 0.091 0.076 0.151 0.101
(% of GDP) (1.584) (0.673) (3.241)*** (1.912)*
Initial human capital 0.009 -0.01 -0.01 -0.001
(1.161) (-0.923) (-1.685)* (-0.094)
Tax revenue -0.216 0.036 -0.015 -0.029
(% of GDP) (-1.883)* (0.324) (-0.202) (-0.376)
Other revenue -0.407 -0.287 -0.153 -0.300
(% of GDP) (-3.664)*** (-1.13) (-1.944)* (-3.072)***
Productive + nonproductive expenditure (-1) 0.225 0.088 0.054 …
(% of GDP) (0.486) (0.552) (0.456)
Square term of productive + nonproductive expenditure (-1) 0.673 -0.275 0.018 …
(% of GDP) (0.652) (-0.502) (0.047)
D F A S T * P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………0 . 0 4 6
(% of GDP) (0.323)
D F A S T * S q u a r e  t e r m  o f  P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………0 . 5 4 8
(% of GDP) (1.052)
D C O M P * P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………0 . 0 6 9
(% of GDP) (0.568)
D C O M P * S q u a r e  t e r m  o f  P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………- 0 . 1 5 8
(% of GDP) (-0.382)
Budget surplus  0.378 0.241 0.186 0.252
(% of GDP) (3.524)*** (2.052)** (2.557)** (3.328)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.210 -0.01 -0.023 -0.016
(-5.494)*** (-0.803) (-2.326)** (-1.566)
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.386 0.268 0.285 0.279
(3.699)*** (3.356)*** (4.467)*** (4.413)***
No. of observations 99 171 270 270
Adjusted R2 0.442 0.096 0.311 0.326























Openness 0.044 -0.281 0.068 0.014
(% of GDP) (2.106)** (-1.344) (1.971)** (0.171)
Total government revenue -0.492 0.192 -0.443 -0.393
(% of GDP) (-1.58) (0.332) (-1.062) (-0.653)
Productive + nonproductive expenditure (-1) 0.508 0.775 1.098 …
(% of GDP) (0.547) (0.735) (1.104)
Square term of productive + nonproductive expenditure (-1) -0.997 -3.210 -3.408 …
(% of GDP) (-0.465) (-1.004) (-1.349)
D F A S T * P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………2 . 5 9 3
(% of GDP) (0.63)
D F A S T * S q u a r e  t e r m  o f  P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………- 2 . 9 7 2
(% of GDP) (-0.339)
D C O M P * P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………2 . 9 4 3
(% of GDP) (1.468)
D C O M P * S q u a r e  t e r m  o f  P r o d u c t i v e  +  n o n p r o d u c t i v e  e x p e n d i t u r e  ( - 1 ) ………- 1 1 . 8 9 4
(% of GDP) (-1.565)
Budget surplus  -0.089 0.051 0.278 0.099
(% of GDP) (-0.261) (0.081) (0.563) (0.157)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.388 -0.052 -0.065 -0.055
(-4.015)*** (-2.672)*** (-2.341)** (-1.521)
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.082 -0.400 -0.650 -0.386
(0.484) (-2.513)** (-4.742)*** (-1.544)
No. of observations 99 171 270 270
Overidentification statistics 1.035 2.514 1.346 2.996
Table 8: Nonlinear Results with Total Public Expenditures (Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one period. DFAST is the dummy 
variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 
otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% 
significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. 














Private investment 0.072 0.096 0.161 0.099
(% of GDP) (1.238) (0.829) (3.337)*** (1.807)*
Initial human capital 0.006 -0.015 -0.009 -0.004
(0.791) (-1.363) (-1.514) (-0.584)
Tax revenue -0.213 -0.011 -0.037 -0.050
(% of GDP) (-1.895)* (-0.084) (-0.451) (-0.597)
Other revenue -0.540 -0.298 -0.190 -0.303
(% of GDP) (-4.039)*** (-1.284) (-1.98)** (-2.915)***
Productive expenditure (-1) 0.826 0.153 -0.080 …
(% of GDP) (1.756)* (0.545) (-0.473)
Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) -0.464 -1.133 0.621 …
(% of GDP) (-0.365) (-0.764) (0.823)
DFAST*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.093
(% of GDP) (0.507)
DFAST*Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.611
(% of GDP) (0.793)
DCOMP*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.137
(% of GDP) (0.613)
DCOMP*Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) … … … -0.943
(% of GDP) (-0.77)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) 0.316 0.068 0.097 0.077
(% of GDP) (1.799)* (0.552) (1.1) (0.859)
Budget surplus  0.463 0.264 0.194 0.249
(% of GDP) (4.073)*** (2.207)** (2.67)*** (3.32)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.205 -0.012 -0.024 -0.018
(-5.456)*** (-0.959) (-2.422)** (-1.769)*
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.376 0.259 0.284 0.271
(3.617)*** (3.216)*** (4.436)*** (4.263)***
No. of observations 120 167 287 287
Adjusted R2 0.449 0.097 0.311 0.326
Table 9: Nonlinearity of Productive Expenditures (panel OLS)
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables 
lagged one period. DFAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the 
dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% 
significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These  significance levels are 
equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.41 
 









Openness 0.024 -0.197 0.056 0.014
(% of GDP) (0.734) (-0.96) (1.026) (0.118)
Total government revenue -0.665 0.655 0.050 0.017
(% of GDP) (-2.164)** (1.102) (0.113) (0.03)
Productive expenditure (-1) 6.061 0.659 1.06 …
(% of GDP) (1.687)* (0.456) (1.037)
Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) -12.969 0.354 -0.687 …
(% of GDP) (-1.508) (0.046) (-0.187)
DFAST*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 4.016
(% of GDP) (0.457)
DFAST*Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) … … … -8.252
(% of GDP) (-0.426)
DCOMP*Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 0.209
(% of GDP) (0.089)
DCOMP*Square term of Productive expenditure (-1) … … … 3.393
(% of GDP) (0.212)
Non-productive expenditure (-1) -2.125 -1.179 -1.377 -1.440
(% of GDP) (-2.5)** (-1.608) (-2.06)** (-2.031)**
Budget surplus  0.735 -0.225 -0.009 0.073
(% of GDP) (1.58) (-0.321) (-0.024) (0.114)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.214 -0.089 -0.08 -0.088
(-1.816)* (-3.245)*** (-4.407)*** (-1.866)*
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.306 -0.387 -0.393 -0.355
(-1.487) (-2.328)** (-2.564)** (-1.553)
No. of observations 99 171 270 270
J-test 1.007 2.321 2.511 2.919
Table 10: Nonlinear Results with Productive and Non-productive Expenditures      
(Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one period. DFAST is 
the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the dummy variable which is 1 for the 
comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% 
significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of
rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients. J-test is for overidentification problem where H0: there is no 
















(1) (2) (3) (4)
Private investment 0.08 0.114 0.163 0.106
(% of GDP) (1.297) (1.009) (3.525)*** (2.048)**
Initial human capital 0.012 -0.017 -0.011 -0.003
(1.353) (-1.435) (-1.804)* (-0.363)
Tax revenue -0.158 -0.045 -0.036 -0.068
(% of GDP) (-1.474) (-0.363) (-0.436) (-0.833)
Other revenue -0.306 -0.372 -0.105 -0.206
(% of GDP) (-2.449)** (-1.644) (-1.434) (-2.437)**
Core expenditure (-1) 0.449 -0.072 -0.001 …
(% of GDP) (2.675)*** (-0.765) (-0.018)
DFAST*Core expenditure (-1) … … … 0.169
(% of GDP) (1.698)*
DCOMP*Core expenditure (-1) … … … -0.019
(% of GDP) (-0.274)
Non-core expenditure (-1) -0.052 0.112 0.099 0.086
(% of GDP) (-0.262) (1.011) (1.185) (1.039)
Budget surplus  0.298 0.276 0.167 0.225
(% of GDP) (2.813)*** (2.332)** (2.367)** (3.034)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.212 -0.013 -0.024 -0.017
(-5.631)*** (-1.067) (-2.471)** (-1.733)*
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.364 0.251 0.280 0.272
(3.375)*** (3.122)*** (4.363)*** (4.277)***
No. of observations 122 167 289 289
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.102 0.312 0.322
Table 11: Results with Core Spending and Non-core Expenditures (panel OLS) 
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1)  indicates 
variables lagged one period. D-FAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. 
DCOMP is the dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in 
parenthesis. * indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance 













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness 0.048 0.134 0.043 0.042
(% of GDP) (1.665)* (1.13) (1.164) (0.914)
Tax revenue 0.007 1.307 0.385 1.051
(% of GDP) (0.014) (0.87) (0.483) (0.903)
Other revenue -0.039 2.156 0.548 1.158
(% of GDP) (-0.069) (0.868) (0.696) (1.026)
Core expenditure (-1) 1.102 -0.226 0.803 …
(% of GDP) (1.591)* (-0.261) (1.162)
DFAST*Core expenditure (-1) ………3 . 1 9 8
(% of GDP) (1.392)
DCOMP*Core expenditure (-1) ………0 . 2 8 7
(% of GDP) (0.292)
Non-core expenditure (-1) -0.996 -0.938 -1.591 -2.211
(% of GDP) (-1.184) (-0.9) (-1.915)* (-1.872)*
Budget surplus  0.000 -1.018 -0.358 -0.971
(% of GDP) (0) (-0.97) (-0.803) (-1.242)
Inflation - consumer price index -0.354 -0.124 -0.110 -0.116
(-3.391)*** (-3.437)*** (-3.461)*** (-2.883)***
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) -0.067 -0.518 -0.385 -0.332
(-0.352) (-2.352)** (-1.991)** (-1.341)
No. of observations 97 169 266 266
Overidentification statistics 3.52 11.101 11.55 6.04
Table 12: Results with Core and Non-core Expenditures                  
(Dynamic Panel - GMM)
Note: The estimation method is a dynamic GMM. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables lagged one 
period. DFAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the 
dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis.   * 
indicates 10% significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. 
These significance levels are equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficients. Overidentification statistics is for instrumental variables where  H0: there is no overidentification 
problem. We fail to reject in each case.
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Private investment 0.073 0.090 0.167 0.114
(% of GDP) (1.199) (0.78) (3.587)*** (2.144)**
Initial human capital 0.011 -0.017 -0.010 -0.003
(1.181) (-1.473) (-1.61) (-0.467)
Tax revenue -0.038 -0.001 -0.044 -0.049
(% of GDP) (-0.315) (-0.008) (-0.534) (-0.579)
Other revenue -0.230 -0.342 -0.136 -0.248
(% of GDP) (-1.784)* (-1.499) (-1.645) (-2.65)***
Core expenditure (-1) -0.474 0.223 -0.126 …
(% of GDP) (-0.966) (0.762) (-0.749)
Square term of Core expenditure (-1) 2.794 -1.781 0.642 …
(% of GDP) (1.997)** (-1.065) (0.81)
DFAST*Core expenditure (-1) … … … 0.104
(% of GDP) (0.518)
DFAST*Square term of Core expenditure (-1) … … … 0.462
(% of GDP) (0.558)
DCOMP*Core expenditure (-1) … … … 0.116
(% of GDP) (0.513)
DCOMP*Square term of Core expenditure (-1) … … … -1.094
(% of GDP) (-0.8)
Non-core expenditure (-1) 0.057 0.051 0.113 0.058
(% of GDP) (0.277) (0.405) (1.322) (0.651)
Budget surplus  0.194 0.262 0.170 0.223
(% of GDP) (1.657)* (2.194)** (2.407)** (2.992)***
Inflation - consumer price index -0.237 -0.013 -0.025 -0.020
(-6.045)*** (-1.012) (-2.564)** (-1.886)*
Growth rate of GDP per capita (-1) 0.360 0.258 0.278 0.274
(3.377)*** (3.196)*** (4.339)*** (4.299)***
No. of observations 122 167 289 289
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.103 0.311 0.321
Table 13: Nonlinearity of Core Expenditures (panel OLS) 
Note: The estimation method is the ordinary least squares for panel data. Annual data are used. (-1) indicates variables 
lagged one period. DFAST is the dummy variable which is 1 for fast growing countries and 0 otherwise. DCOMP is the 
dummy variable which is 1 for the comparison group and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are given in parenthesis. * indicates 10% 
significance level, ** indicates 5% significance level, and *** indicates 1% significance level. These  significance levels are 
equal to one minus the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis of zero coefficients.45 
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Figure 1 ‐GDP per capita growth (annual %)
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Figure 2 ‐GDP (in constant 2000 US$) per 
labor force
Fast growing countries Comparison group
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Figure 3 ‐Industry, value added (% of GDP)
Fast growing countries Comparison group
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Figure 5 ‐Gross public fixed capital formation 
(in % of GDP)
Fast growing countries Comparison group
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Figure 6 ‐Government Effectiveness
1996 2007
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Figure 7 ‐Average Bureaucracy Quality
(index between 0‐4, higher index higher quality)
Fast growing countries Comparison group
 